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Abstract 
We employ senior bank loan officers' responses regarding actual and expected loan demand from 
enterprises linking successive surveys in order to determine the dominant expectation formation 
mechanism that best describes European senior bank loan officers’ expectations. We utilize 
quarterly data for loan demand from enterprises from the European Bank Lending Survey for 14 
Euro-area countries spanning the period 2003Q1 to 2019Q4. Our findings suggest that the adaptive 
expectations mechanism is compatible with senior bank loan officers' expectations for loan 
demand from enterprises. Our study contributes to the understanding of the formation of loan 
demand expectations and hence our findings can be very useful for monetary policy purposes. 
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“Expectations are central to the conduct of monetary policy” 
Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the ECB - Annual Congress of the European Economic Association, 
Manchester, 27 August 20191 
 
1. Introduction 
In the framework of monetary policy, it is essential to comprehend how agents (senior bank 
loan officers in our case) form their expectations for loan demand from enterprises. According to 
Anastasiou and Drakos (2019), monetary authorities evaluate the conditions of the banking sector 
for the purpose of designing and implementing the proper policies, not only by depending on hard 
statistics, but also by complementing them with the so-called soft data reflecting demand and 
supply conditions. 
Anastasiou and Drakos (2019) studied how senior bank loan officers form their expectations 
for loan supply in the Euro-area. However, this study sheds light only on the expectation formation 
mechanisms of the supply side of the loan market. We set out to fill this gap in the literature by 
examining the equally interesting research question of how senior bank loan officers shape their 
loan demand expectations in the Euro-area. In other words, are senior bank loan officers’ 
expectations for loan demand from enterprises rational, adaptive or regressive? To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first empirical study in the literature that tries to answer this question.  
We utilize survey responses from successive surveys obtained from the Bank Lending Survey 
(BLS) in order to examine how bank loan officers’ expectations of future business loan demand 
are fulfilled when are confronted with the realized outcomes. Our results qualify adaptive 
expectations as the mechanism that most adequately describes the formation of expectations.  
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This study also contributes to the empirical literature on expectation formation mechanisms 
in the following manner: in order to empirically evaluate the above expectations, we use survey 
data on expectations for loan demand from enterprises for all the available countries (14 Eurozone 
countries) included in the BLS dataset. To the best of our knowledge, existing studies have not 
used these data before, and we aim at filling this gap in the literature.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we present a comprehensive 
literature review, while Section 3 describes the data and the variables we use. In Section 4, we 
describe the econometric methodology, and Section 5 presents the estimation results. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
The notion of rational expectations was a paradigm shift in economics. Muth (1961) was the 
first to introduce the idea of the rational expectations hypothesis (REH hereafter). According to 
Muth (1961), rational expectations are defined as “the true mathematical expectation of the 
variable of interest conditional on information on all other related variables known.” After his 
pioneering study, Lucas (1972), Frenkel (1975), Sargent and Wallace (1976), and Goodwin and 
Sheffrin (1982) further developed the notion of REH. These studies on rational expectations have 
produced a revolution in economics2, spawning a significant amount of literature regarding the 
efficiency and formation of the expectations hypothesis.  
However, many studies have been conducted supporting that the REH is not always the best 
way of describing the economy. Chow (1989, 2011) explained that adaptive expectations are 
superior to rational expectations by providing strong econometric evidence. Moosa and 
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 Pesaran (1987), Goodwin and Sheffrin (1982), and Dominitz and Manski (1997) have mentioned that the notion of 
the REH has impressively revised the way that economic policy, as well as economic modeling, is conducted. 
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Shamsuddin (2004) concluded that the expectation formation mechanism that dominates the 
exchange rate market is the adaptive expectations hypothesis. Finally, Jongen and Verschoor 
(2007) found that interest rate forecasts are not rational, thus implying that agents do not use all 
the existing information they have in an efficient way.  
According to Chow (1989, 2011) and Drakos (2008), there is a plethora of reasons why the 
REH has been criticized by the literature. First, the REH does not premise any special expectation 
formation mechanism. Second, the REH states that regardless of how forecasts are produced, 
agents’ rationality, in combination with market discipline, should eradicate all persistent errors 
and lead all participants/agents to make efficient use of all the available information. Another 
important disadvantage of testing the REH empirically is that the expectation (forecast) errors are 
usually formed through ex-post observed data. A way to bypass this disadvantage is to measure 
expectations by relying on survey data (Pesaran and Weale, 2006; Drakos, 2008; Miah et. al., 
2016). 
Expectations have been modeled in an ad hoc manner by many previous studies. However, 
there is a rapidly increasing amount of research on the mechanisms that form the expectations 
employing survey data3 (Frankel and Froot, 1987; Fraser and MacDonald, 1993; Madsen, 1996; 
Dominitz and Manski, 1997; Dutt and Ghosh, 1997; Kim, 1997; Pesaran and Weale, 2006; Drakos, 
2008; Prat and Uctum, 2011; Dave 2011; Miah et. al., 2016; Anastasiou and Drakos, 2019). The 
main benefit of using survey data is that by definition correspond to expectations that the 
respondents state. As Manski (2004) asserted, one of the best ways to assess both the accuracy and 
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Madsen, 1996; Lee and Shields, 2000).  
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the correctness of expectations is to follow the respondents as time passes and then contrast their 
expectations with the real events they experience. 
3. Data Issues 
For both actual (realized) and expected loan demand from enterprises (LD) we employ data 
from the BLS. The BLS is a survey-based database updated four times a year (i.e., on a quarterly 
basis) by the ECB, encompassing very useful information about the bank lending conditions in the 
Euro-area. Specifically, the European Central Bank (ECB) dispatches a questionnaire to senior 
bank loan officers from 150 Euro-area banks inviting them to provide information about the 
realized developments along with their expectations for the future.  The BLS contains 22 questions, 
both backward and forward-looking, on past and expected developments respectively.  
In any given BLS issue, senior bank loan officers are invited to respond on the future 
(expected) LD from enterprises, as well as for the corresponding occurred (actual) LD from 
enterprises in the previous period. Consequently, by linking successive survey responses, we 
investigate whether senior bank loan officers’ expectations for LD from enterprises are formed 
rationally, and if deviations from rationality exist, we examine whether they conform to other 
widely known expectation formation mechanisms (i.e., adaptive and regressive expectations).  
[6] 
 
In the following boxes we provide the relevant questions from the BLS: 
Question Q6: Over the past three months (apart from normal seasonal fluctuations), how has the 
demand for loans or credit line to enterprises changed at your bank? Please refer to the financing need of 
enterprises independent of whether this need will result in a loan or not. 
 
Answer: 
• Decreased considerably 
• Decreased somewhat 
• Remained basically unchanged 
• Increased somewhat 
• Increased considerably 
Source: Bank Lending Survey Questionnaire, Section 1: Loans or credit lines to enterprises, question Q6. 
 
Question Q9: Please indicate how you expect demand for loans or credit lines to enterprises to change 
at your bank over the next three months (apart from normal seasonal fluctuations)? Please refer to the 
financing need of enterprises independent of whether this need will result in a loan or not. 
 
Answer: 
• Decreased considerably 
• Decreased somewhat 
• Remained basically unchanged 
• Increased somewhat 
• Increased considerably 
Source: Bank Lending Survey Questionnaire, Section 1: Loans or credit lines to enterprises, question Q9. 
 
Our sample covers the period 2003Q1-2019Q4 for 14 Euro-area countries. This produces an 
unbalanced panel dataset of 769 observations, consisting of country-quarterly dimensions. 
Moreover, the data for LD are provided by the BLS as a diffusion index4 and not as the senior bank 
loan officers’ raw responses. Pursuant to the definition of the diffusion index, lower (greater) 
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values signify decreased (increased) LD from enterprises. In Table 1, we report the sample 
averages of each CS by country. 
*****Insert Table 1 here***** 
In Figure 1, we depict the trajectory between the actual and expected LD from enterprises 
across the Euro-area countries of our sample. Although both actual and expected LD seem to have 
a common trajectory across time, expected LD is higher than actual LD.  In other words, there 
doesn’t seem to be a one-for-one relationship between expected and actual LD. This observation 
provides preliminary evidence in favor of the REH not being consistent with the data. Last, we 
observe that both LD types experienced significant decreases (i.e., lower loan demand from 
enterprises) with the onset of the recent financial crisis. 
*****Insert Figure 1 here***** 
4. Empirical Methodology and Testable Hypotheses 
The starting point of our empirical methodology is to test for the REH. The REH is the 
expectation formation mechanism according to which agents use all the relevant and available 
optimal (i.e., rational and efficient) information, which sooner or later will expunge systematic 
forecasting errors. In other words, pursuant to the REH, agents do not make any systematic errors 
in forecasting because they take into consideration the whole set of available information. 
The scatterplot of Figure 2 provides a pictorial representation of the actual vs. expected LD 
from enterprises. According to Figure 2, it is unclear whether senior bank loan officers’ 
expectations for loan demand are formed rationally.  
*****Insert Figure 2 here***** 
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Following Lovell (1986), Drakos (2008) and Anastasiou and Drakos (2019), we examine the 
REH by employing the following model: 𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑡𝐴 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1𝐸 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡,  (1) 
 
 where i, t, A and E denote country, time, actual LD and expected LD, respectively. We 
express the expected LD from enterprises with a time lag at the right-hand side of the equation to 
signify that the expectations for loan demand have been shaped prior to the actual outcome.  
In order to accept the REH, the following associated joint hypotheses of unbiasedness must 
not be rejected: 
Ho: 𝛼0 = 0, 𝛼1 = 1. 
Next, we turn our attention to test the adaptive expectations hypothesis. The adaptive 
expectations mechanism is defined as a way of forming expectations in which the future value of 
the under-examination variable is solely dependent on its past values. Consistent with the adaptive 
expectations mechanism, senior bank loan officers modify their expectations in each period 
depending on the expectation (or forecasting) error of the previous period. If a zero forecasting 
error existed (i.e., a perfect forecast in the previous period), it would suggest that the previous 
expectation would be maintained perpetually (Lovell, 1986). 
Following Lovell (1986), Moosa and Shamsuddin (2004), Drakos (2008), and Anastasiou and 
Drakos (2019), we define the adaptive expectations model as:  𝛥𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1𝐸 = 𝜃(𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2𝐸 − 𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1𝐴 ) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, (2) 
 
where i, t, A and E denote country, time, actual LD and expected LD, respectively. Parameter 
θ is the coefficient of adaptation, showing the pace of adjustment to the previous period’s 
[9] 
 
expectation error. In order to accept the adaptive expectations hypothesis, parameter θ must be 
statistically significant and lie in the interval (-1,0).  
We test whether parameter θ is statistically significant, and we also test whether θ is different 
from its maximum theoretical value (-1): 
(a) H0: θ = 0 
(b) H0: θ = -1. 
According to the regressive expectations hypothesis, agents adjust their expectations 
pertaining to the previous period’s deviation from the mean for the under-examination variable 
(LD in our case). That is, agents believe that the variable of interest shows a propensity to move 
towards its average value (Drakos, 2008). Following Pesaran and Weale (2006), Drakos (2008), 
Dave (2011), and Anastasiou and Drakos (2019), the regressive expectations mechanism can be 
specified as follows: 𝛥𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 𝐸 = 𝜓(?̃? − 𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑡𝐴 ) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, (3) 
 
where i, t, A, E, Δ, ?̃? and 𝜓 denote country, time, actual LD, expected LD, first differences, 
the sample mean of the actual LD and the adjustment parameter, respectively.  
The REH is consistent with the data if and only if parameter ψ is statistically significant, 
positive and lies in the (0, 1) interval. In addition, apart from testing whether parameter ψ is 
different from zero, we also examine whether it is different from its maximum theoretical value 
(+1):  
(a) H0: ψ = 0 
(b) H0: ψ = 1. 
[10] 
 
5. Estimation Results 
We estimate our econometric specifications with both fixed and random effects (Wooldridge, 
2010). The Hausman (1978) specification test suggests that the fixed effects estimator is the most 
suitable methodology for the rational and adaptive expectations models, while for the regressive 
expectations model it suggests the random effects estimator as the most appropriate method. 
Nevertheless, we report the results for both estimation methodologies.  
Table 2 contains all the estimation results for each expectation formation mechanism along 
with the corresponding hypotheses tests. As far as the results of the REH are concerned, although 
we find that parameter a1 is statistically significant at the 1% level, we emphatically reject the null 
hypothesis that the parameter is equal to 1. This finding provides evidence against the unbiasedness 
hypothesis and consequently against rationality. Therefore, we conclude that senior bank loan 
officers do not form their expectations for loan demand from enterprises rationally. In other words, 
the REH is not consistent with our data. 
With respect to the adaptive expectations mechanism, we document that the speed of 
adjustment θ is statistically significant at the 1% level (i.e., non-trivial). We also find that 
parameter θ is different from its maximum theoretical value of -1. The absolute magnitude of the 
point estimate of parameter θ suggests an adaptation rate of about 45.6% and 47.5% for the random 
and fixed effects approaches, respectively. Thus, 2.19 and 2.11 time periods are needed, on 
average, to cover the distance between the actual and expected LD for both random and fixed 
effects methods, respectively.  
Parameter θ carries a negative sign, suggesting that if senior bank loan officers had 
overestimated (underestimated) the actual LD in the current period, they would then adjust 
downwards (upwards) their expectations for the next period. Moreover, we find that the point 
[11] 
 
estimate parameter θ lies in the (0, 1) interval for both random and fixed effects estimation 
methodologies, respectively. Therefore, we document that adaptive expectations are consistent 
with our data. Our findings are in line with the results of Anastasiou and Drakos (2019), who also 
found that the adaptive expectations hypothesis is the dominant expectation formation mechanism 
for the European bank loan officers’ expectations for bank loan supply. 
Moving to the regressive expectations hypothesis, although we find that the adjustment 
parameter ψ is non-trivial in both estimation methods, its point estimates were found to be 
negative. Therefore, the regressive expectations mechanism is not consistent with our data.  
*****Insert Table 2 here***** 
Apart from examining which expectation formation mechanism best describes our data for the 
whole sample, we deem it appropriate to conduct a sensitivity analysis re-estimating our models 
breaking our sample into two sub groups. Specifically, we break our sample into core and 
peripheral Euro-area countries. Following Anastasiou et. al., (2019), we define Austria, Belgium, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Slovenia as core countries while 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain are considered peripheral ones. Therefore, we re-
estimate each of our models twice, once for each country group.  
In Tables 3 and 4, we report the results for the core and peripheral countries, respectively. We 
find for both country groups that the adaptive expectations hypothesis is the dominant expectation 
formation mechanism. Thus, our findings are robust since they retain their significance even when 
we divide our sample.  
*****Insert Tables 3 and 4 here***** 
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Given that our sample covers the pre-crisis, the crisis and the post-crisis period, we consider 
it imperative to demonstrate a second sensitivity analysis. In particular, we re-estimate the baseline 
specifications twice, once for the pre-crisis period (2003Q1-2007Q4) and once for the crisis period 
(2008Q1-2016Q1). We define the beginning of the recent financial crisis in Europe the year 2008 
(Ivashina, and Scharfstein, 2010; Lane, 2012; Demirguc Kunt et. al., 2013; Gibson et. al., 2016). 
Furthermore, following Anastasiou et. al., (2019) we define the crisis period in the Euro-area to 
last until 2016Q1. The estimation results reported in Tables 5 and 6 are in line with our previous 
findings, which suggest that either before or during the 2008 financial crisis the European senior 
bank loan officers form their expectations for LD in an adaptive manner. 
*****Insert Tables 5 and 6 here***** 
6. Conclusions 
We utilize survey data from the BLS for the period 2003Q1-2019Q4 and for 14 Euro-area 
countries to explore the performance of diverse competing expectation formation mechanisms for 
senior bank loan officers’ expectations for loan demand. We study the three major expectation 
formation mechanisms, the rational, adaptive and regressive expectations mechanisms. Our results 
indicate that senior bank loan officers do not shape their expectations for loan demand from 
enterprises rationally. We find evidence in favor of the adaptive expectations mechanism being the 
best description of the data. Our results are consistent for every country group we examined (all 
Euro-area, core and peripheral countries). We also document that either before or during the 2008 
financial crisis the European senior bank loan officers form their expectations for LD in an adaptive 
manner. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Mean values of LD by country 
Diffusion Indices 
Countries 𝐋𝐃𝐢,𝐭 𝐀  𝐋𝐃𝐢,𝐭−𝟏𝐄  
Austria -2.432 4.441 
Belgium 0.029 8.382 
Cyprus 2.194 9.867 
Estonia 2.059 8.367 
Germany 3.194 5.323 
Greece -2.507 7.426 
Ireland 3.865 6.779 
Italy -1.194 6.558 
Latvia -0.600 6.485 
Lithuania -0.784 0.941 
Luxembourg -2.906 5.953 
Portugal 10.434 11.304 
Slovenia 20.526 15.263 
Spain -5.164 2.558 
Total (average for 
the Euro-area) 0.577 6.565 
Notes: (a) This table reports the mean diffusion indices of both actual and expected loan 
demand from enterprises by country along with the corresponding mean diffusion 
indices for the whole sample (average for the Euro-area), (b) LDi,t A and LDi,t−1 E denote 
actual and expected LD respectively. 
 
[17] 
 
Table 2: Estimation results for each expectation formation mechanism – Full Sample 
 
Rational Adaptive Regressive 
Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects 𝜶𝟏 0.611*** (0.047) 0.619*** (0.045) - - - - 
θ - - -0.475*** (0.037) 
-0.456*** 
(0.036) - - 
ψ - - - - -0.070** (0.020) 
-0.064*** 
(0.022) 
Constant -3.608*** (0.318) 
-3.216*** 
(1.166) 
2.830*** 
(0.232) 
2.710*** 
(0.406) 
-0.117*** 
(0.001) 
-0.117 
(0.124) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 769 
R2 0.309 0.309 0.282 0.282 0.007 0.007 
F-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.004 
Hausman-test 
(p-value) 0.001 0.000 0.413 
Hypothesis Testing (probability values) 
H0: 𝜶𝟏 = 𝟎 0.000 0.000 - - - - 
H0: 𝜶𝟏 = 𝟏 0.000 0.000 - - - - 
H0: ψ = 0 - - - - 0.014 0.004 
H0: θ = 0 - - 0.000 0.000 - - 
H0: ψ = +1 - - - - 0.000 0.000 
H0: θ = -1 - - 0.000 0.000 - - 
Notes: (a) This table reports estimation results for each expectation formation mechanism for the full sample, (b) *, **, *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively, (c) numbers in parentheses denote cluster robust standard errors, (d) α1, θ and ψ are the estimated parameters 
for Rational, Adaptive and Regressive Expectations respectively, (e) Hausman-test denotes the Hausman (1978) test and its p-values suggest that the fixed 
effects estimator is the most suitable methodology for the rational and adaptive expectations models, while for the regressive expectations model suggest 
the random effects estimator as the most appropriate method. 
[18] 
 
 
Table 3: Estimation results for each expectation formation mechanism - Core Euro-area countries 
 
Rational Adaptive Regressive 
Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects 𝜶𝟏 0.550*** (0.045) 0.558*** (0.041) - - - - 
θ - - -0.477*** (0.029) 
-0.454*** 
(0.026) - - 
ψ - - - - -0.069** (0.027) 
-0.061*** 
(0.023) 
Constant -2.812*** (0.313) 
-2.326 
(1.492) 
2.698*** 
(0.175) 
2.562*** 
(0.488) 
-0.153*** 
(0.011) 
-0.150 
(0.177) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 479 
R2 0.261 0.261 0.275 0.275 0.005 0.060 
F-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.034 0.009 
Hausman-test 
(p-value) 0.016 0.003 0.477 
Hypothesis Testing (probability values) 
H0: 𝜶𝟏 = 𝟎 0.000 0.000 - - - - 
H0: 𝜶𝟏 = 𝟏 0.000 0.000 - - - - 
H0: ψ = 0 - - - - 0.034 0.009 
H0: θ = 0 - - 0.000 0.000 - - 
H0: ψ = +1 - - - - 0.000 0.000 
H0: θ = -1 - - 0.000 0.000 - - 
Notes: (a) This table reports estimation results for each expectation formation mechanism for the core Euro-area countries , (b) *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively, (c) numbers in parentheses denote cluster robust standard errors, (d)  α1, θ and ψ are the estimated 
parameters for Rational, Adaptive and Regressive Expectations respectively, (e) Hausman-test denotes the Hausman (1978) test and its p-values suggest that 
the fixed effects estimator is the most suitable methodology for the rational and adaptive expectations models, while for the regressive expectations model 
suggest the random effects estimator as the most appropriate method. 
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Table 4: Estimation results for each expectation formation mechanism - Peripheral Euro-area countries 
 
Rational Adaptive Regressive 
Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects 𝜶𝟏 0.682*** (0.078) 0.691*** (0.073) - - - - 
θ - - -0.473*** (0.087) 
-0.459*** 
(0.086) - - 
ψ - - - - -0.071 (0.046) 
-0.067 
(0.042) 
Constant -4.686*** (0.496) 
-4.423** 
(2.041) 
3.049*** 
(0.585) 
2.958*** 
(0.768) 
-0.055 
(0.042) 
-0.059 
(0.208) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 290 
R2 0.370 0371 0.293 0.293 0.008 0.009 
F-test (p-value) 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.198 0.117 
Hausman-test 
(p-value) 0.000 0.062 0.671 
Hypothesis Testing (probability values) 
H0: 𝜶𝟏 = 𝟎 0.001 0.000 - - - - 
H0: 𝜶𝟏 = 𝟏 0.015 0.000 - - - - 
H0: ψ = 0 - - - - 0.198 0.117 
H0: θ = 0 - - 0.005 0.000 - - 
H0: ψ = +1 - - - - 0.000 0.000 
H0: θ = -1 - - 0.004 0.000 - - 
Notes: (a) This table reports estimation results for each expectation formation mechanism for the peripheral Euro-area countries, (b) *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively, (c) numbers in parentheses denote cluster robust standard errors, (d) α1, θ and ψ are 
the estimated parameters for Rational, Adaptive and Regressive Expectations respectively, (e) Hausman-test denotes the Hausman (1978) test and its 
p-values suggest that the fixed effects estimator is the most suitable methodology for the rational and adaptive expectations models, while for the 
regressive expectations model suggest the random effects estimator as the most appropriate method. 
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Table 5: Estimation results for each expectation formation mechanism – Pre-crisis period  
 
Rational Adaptive Regressive 
Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects 𝜶𝟏 0.560*** (0.092) 0.559*** (0.086) - - - - 
θ - - -0.571*** (0.050) 
-0.455*** 
(0.057) - - 
ψ - - - - -0.131* (0.060) 
-0.099 
(0.061) 
Constant -2.327** (0.971) 
-1.931 
(1.658) 
4.266*** 
(0.354) 
3.445*** 
(1.113) 
-0.176 
(0.185) 
-0.080 
(0.632) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 183 173 
R2 0.279 0.279 0.365 0.364 0.019 0.018 
F-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.058 0.104 
Hausman-test 
(p-value) 0.962 0.000 0.289 
Hypothesis Testing (probability values) 
H0: 𝜶𝟏 = 𝟎 0.000 0.000 - - - - 
H0: 𝜶𝟏 = 𝟏 0.001 0.000 - - - - 
H0: ψ = 0 - - - - 0.058 0.104 
H0: θ = 0 - - 0.000 0.000 - - 
H0: ψ = +1 - - - - 0.000 0.000 
H0: θ = -1 - - 0.000 0.000 - - 
Notes: (a) This table reports estimation results for each expectation formation mechanism for the for the full sample but for the  Pre-crisis period, (b) 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively, (c) numbers in parentheses denote cluster robust standard errors, 
(d) α1, θ and ψ are the estimated parameters for Rational, Adaptive and Regressive Expectations respectively, (e) Hausman-test denotes the Hausman 
(1978) test and its p-values suggest that the fixed effects estimator is the most suitable methodology for the adaptive expectations models, while for 
both the rational and the regressive expectation models suggest the random effects estimator as the most appropriate method. 
[21] 
 
Table 6: Estimation results for each expectation formation mechanism –  Crisis period 
 
Rational Adaptive Regressive 
Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects 𝜶𝟏 0.623*** (0.050) 0.635*** (0.047) - - - - 
θ - - -0.483*** (0.048) 
-0.457*** 
(0.044) - - 
ψ - - - - -0.067** (0.025) 
-0.057*** 
(0.022) 
Constant -3.911*** (0.279) 
-3.560*** 
(1.336) 
2.660*** 
(0.292) 
2.501*** 
(0.515) 
-0.156*** 
(0.025) 
-0.166 
(0.182) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 586 596 
R2 0.302 0.312 0.303 0.284 0.008 0.007 
F-test (p-value) 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.021 0.009 
Hausman-test 
(p-value) 0.002 0.000 0.324 
Hypothesis Testing (probability values) 
H0: 𝜶𝟏 = 𝟎 0.000 0.000 - - - - 
H0: 𝜶𝟏 = 𝟏 0.000 0.000 - - - - 
H0: ψ = 0 - - - - 0.021 0.009 
H0: θ = 0 - - 0.000 0.000 - - 
H0: ψ = +1 - - - - 0.000 0.000 
H0: θ = -1 - - 0.000 0.000 - - 
Notes: (a) This table reports estimation results for each expectation formation mechanism for the full sample but for the crisis period, (b) *, **, *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively, (c) numbers in parentheses denote cluster robust standard errors, (d) α1, θ 
and ψ are the estimated parameters for Rational, Adaptive and Regressive Expectations respectively, (e) Hausman-test denotes the Hausman (1978) test 
and its p-values suggest that the fixed effects estimator is the most suitable methodology for the rational and adaptive expectations models, while for 
the regressive expectations model suggest the random effects estimator as the most appropriate method. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Trajectory between actual vs expected average loan demand across the 
Euro-area countries 
 
Source: Own calculations, ECB 
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Figure 2: Scatter plot of actual vs expected loan demand  
 
Source: Own calculations, ECB 
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